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In the world today. it is indisputable fact that some states have much higher standards of 
Jjving than others. For humanitarians, concerned with the general state of mankind, this is a 
troublesome problem. These scholars ask themselves questions such as, <How can society 
bring all states to a level where their people are no longer subsisting, but living?" and "What 
can we do to perpetuate this change?" . As a matter of fact, these very issues are a vital 
component of the endeavors of international organizations. The United Nations and 
innumerable others strive to help struggling states bring themselves to a level commensurate 
with the rest of the developed world, donating an immeasurable amount of time, expertise, 
and money to these secondary states. However, as many scholars so aptly argue, it is without 
utility to attempt to solve a problem on the surface, by simply offering financial help for 
example. The onJy way that true and lasting change is going to be achieved for these 
underdeveloped states is by identifying the underlying causes for their present-day situations; 
knowing the root of the problem is a prerequisite to being abJe to effectively solve it. In the 
particular case of identifying the essential reasons for the difficulties that third world states 
are experiencing, it is necessary to go back only as far as each states' colonial history. 
Although a few exceptions exist, the majority of states which are today underdeveloped have 
one factor in common, the importance of which is difficult to overstate~ they all experienced 
extensive periods during which they were ruJed as colonies. Thus, in order to go forward in 
finding real and lasting solutions to their development impediments, the international 
community must focus on the nature of colonialism and its present-day manifestations in 
these states. 
Beginning five and six hundred years ago, European states began to get ambitious; 
suddenly the world appeared to be a much bigger place. In their search for grandeur, prestige, 
and power these great European powers began to send adventurers sailing into the unknown 
to claim new places for the motherland. Although many states became extensive 
empire-builders, in an attempt to narrow this inquiry into a more manageable task, it is useful 
to choose just one of the European states active in imperialism, in this instance France. In 
studying this question, a methodology seems apparent First, one must understand why 
European states, France in particular, chose to become imperialistic. Secondly, it is 
appropriate to ask what legacy French colonization left in general for its former possession. 
And lastly, specific cases will be examined; that is to say, several former French colonies will 
be dissected to discern the lasting effects of French imperialism on their contemporary 
situations. 
Imperialist theory is the subject of innumerable books and scholarly pieces of literature; 
an attempt will be made here to summarize the most significant reasons European powers had 
for embarking upon colonizing efforts. It is difficuJt to rank the factors in order of 
importance, so having said such the emotional facet to imperialist theory will be the first to 
merit attention. Essentially, European powers wished to have colonies to make themselves 
appear grander. Economic considerations notwithstanding, it was colonies' status as 
possessions which was important in this sense. The race was to see who could have the most; 
that state must be the best It became a matter of national pride; European states were 
competing to see who could obtain the most colonies, convert the most people to its 
enlightened, cosmopolitan culture and thus have "one up" on the other states trying to 
colonize. As 1. Bebin succinctly observes, secretary general of a Valeniciennes geography 
society, "In order to remain a great nation or to become one, a people should colonize." 
Moreover, as Europeans thought of themselves as the apex of enlightened civilization, it was 
simply beyond comprehension that the rest of the world might not desire to be European. 
They were so nationahstic and proud that they could not fathom the notion that they were not 
doing the conquered people a gre.at favor. As they saw it, who would not welcome the chance 
to be introduced to and to belong to a great European power? (Murphy 12-40). 
In addition, it is easy to see the economic theory which propelJe<! colonization. The 
colonies provided two things for the colonizing states; a ready-made market for European 
goods and a source of raw materials for the motherland. Indeed, a quote from a French 
geograph.ical society sums up the pro-imperialist stance with brevity and poignancy, 
beginning with a rebuttal to an argument that when colonies are attained, Frenchmen will take 
themselves and their wealth out of France and to the new colony, 
Everyone agrees in recognizing that the emigration of capital and of 
population, far from diminishing the wealth of a country, on the contrary, 
increases it: that colonies offer markets for raw materials, the means of 
production, the products lacking to the mother-country; that they open markets to 
aJt the commerce and all the industry of an o1d country, by the wants, by the new 
needs of the people with whom they are in relation, and that the emigrants Dot 
only remain consumers but that they become more important consumers, 
emigration procuring for them a well-being, saving things which they never 
possessed before (Murphy 29). 
Essentially, this is quite sound economic philosophy. The colonizer prohibits the colonies 
from producing or procuring from others certain goods. The motherland then has an assured 
market for its products. Moreover, the motherland is able to rape the colonies of their natural 
resources and raw materials, without anything approaching j ust compensation. Finally, as the 
French society aptly elevates to consciousness, when Frenchmen move from Europe to inhabit 
the colonies, they will bring with them their French tastes and consumer habits, which will 
produce a market for French goods in the faraway colonies. Moreover, these new settlers will 
playa vital role in introducing the natives to a European way of life (Mwpby 29). 
Thus, the theory of imperialism in general rests of two basic principles, imbuing the 
notion of colonization with both emotional and economic notions. Based on these 
foundations, most of the powerful European nations colonized competitively and with zeal. 
The French, however, always distinct, did not approach imperialism in the same manner at 
all, especially as France traveled through the nineteenth century. 
First and foremost, the French were not interested in widespread colonization due to 
more prominent concerns at home. Throughout the history of Europe, two provinces that 
France considers vital to its sense of nationality, AJsace and Lorraine, have been the cause of 
much turmoil for the nation. Changing hands several times between France and Germany, 
Alsace-Lorraine was the cause of much emotion and intense feelings for Frenchmen. Thus, 
they were appalled at the notion suggested by some that France use her resources for any 
other purpose than regaining the lost provinces so essential to the Frencb state. Moreover, 
due to the general French disposition. they were simply not inclined to be terribly militaristic. 
Burned several times already the Frenchmen were quite content to be self-contained, 
worrying only about France alld leaving the rest of the world to its own vices. 
Following along the same line of logic, it is argued that France simply turned inward, 
concentrating too much on hersel f to even realize that the rest of the world exists. Finally, in 
the eighteen hundreds. several questions were posed by a gentleman which are quoted by 
Murphy, questions which were being asked by all of those trying to assess France's position 
on colonialism. He says, 
What has become of her preponderance on the sea and in colonies which 
seemed assured two centuries ago? Has she explored the polar regions? Has she 
taken a sufficient part in the important voyages to Africa during this epoch in 
which we are living? No. Does she emigrate? Little. Has she a merchant 
marine? The sixth only in rank of importance. Why? .. She has forgotten the 
ocean routes and distant countries; she tends inward in an ignorance too often 
foolishly vain, in a peurile fear of the unknown (Murphy 37). 
Now that general imperialistic theory has been set forth, and the French perspective 
specifically. the point to make is the implications colonization by France bas for its former 
colonies; a look at the legacies left behind even after France has officially withdrawn her 
presence. Perhaps most significantly, France's colonization has left an ongoing and quite 
basic block to the ability of her former colonies to develop their economies to keep pace with 
the rest of the world. To examine basic economic fact for a moment, it is obvious that the 
rule in the world is '''ceaseless capital accumulation" (Taylor 14). To compete as a state in the 
world economy. a nation must have an economy which stresses private economic transactions 
for private economic gain. 1n order to achieve such a structure however, a state must be 
possessed of three "classes" of people. First there are those who actuaUy control the capital, 
known as "capital owners," then come those the "cadres" who organize the business 
transactions, and then one finds the wage laborers, who penonn the duties dictated by those 
who own the capital and those who manage it. As an economic system becomes more 
complex, it is this "'midd1e class" of organizers that increases inproportionately in importance. 
This middle class "organizes, educates, manages, polices, plans, heals, supervises, counsels, 
and controls the direct producers in their relations with the controller of capital" (Taylor 14). 
On the other hand, in African states which recently became I iberated from French rule, 
this middle class hardly exists. Class structures in these states are extremely polarized, with a 
few elite who control all ofllie capita] and thousands of wage workers who barely subsist. 
This societal setup encourages "relative social and political instability," in addition to 
erecting significant barriers to establishing a prosperous, capitaJist economy (Taylor 15). 
Another institution produced by colonization and often overlooked is a probJem with 
personal identity. Nonnally, a people have a nationality, a history, a background, which 
defines who they are essentially, both on a collective and individual basis. As Taylor 
elaborates, a people is a "solidarity grouping, through which individuals and their households 
express their basic identities" (Taylor 15). However, when a people become colonized, their 
concept of themselves is changed forever. Taylor again sums up the point succinctly with 
this, "people are the result of general political strategies that exploit personal cultural 
jdentities'~ (Taylor] 5). 
Thus, the longer they are colonized, the more that these "peoples" begin to lose sight of 
any sense of belonging, of any national identity. It follows therefore that when they gain the 
liberation that they seemingly so desire, they really are not swe of where to go with it, so to 
speak.. They have no coherent sense of collectively. This is a major difficulty in keeping 
pace with the rest of the world because, as Taylor s1ates, "peoples are the major means by 
which individuals and households are socially integrated into the capitalist world-economy 
(Taylor 16). 
Finally, colonization has left a legacy of political instability, for the above-stated reasons 
and also because of the actual length of time that tbe natives were not involved in their own 
destiny. For lack ofa better phrase, as a group they are simply out of practice of ruling 
themselves. It is a well-established theory that stable politicaJ systems are the product of 
tradition., and colonized states have no tradition of peaceful and successful self-rule. As 
Taylor aptly states, 
The legacy of imperialism is various forms of authoritarian states to be 
sure, but the coercive order that is achieved covers a very wide spectrum. At one 
end are the various 'national security states' epitomized by the Latin American 
political experience of the 19705 where order is maintained by a relatively 
sophisticated coercive state apparatus. At the other extreme are what are almost 
'fictitious states' run by ' warlords' or armed groups with the 'state apparatus' 
reduced to a matter of personal power. Sandbrook (1985, P 35) suggests that the 
African states of Chad, Uganda, Equatorial Gwnea, and Zaire fit into this 
category. Even in less authoritarian periphery states such as India, elective office 
is primarily viewed as a resource for personal aggrandizement. Hence order, 
where it is acbieved, is invariably bought at a very heavy price (Taylor 17). 
Finally, a few unrelated, miscellaneous problems warrant mention, although not substantial 
enough to command more than a sentence or so by way of explanation. For one, it should be 
noted that the colonial powers, France included, did little by way of building any sort of 
infrastructure. Although zealous in quickly extracting resources, the colonizing countries did 
little by way of assuring the colonized states a tructure whkh would sustain them after 
gaining independence. Finally, one can see that race and ethnicity have been barriers to 
forming comprehensive states. The white European elite still feels an innate superiority and 
right to rule, whereas the black majority is increasingly demanding power and self-rule. In 
addition, ethnic differences resuJt in intense rivalries, resulting in chaos and violence, as 
opposed to comprehensive systems of government (Taylor 15-18). 
Case Study 1: Algeria 
During the early 18005, the politicaJ situation in France was troublesome, with the 
unsteady reign of Charles X. Thus. when a dispute erupted with Algeria over an unpaid 
wheat bill. he saw the perfect opportunity to create a situation to divert attention from his 
regime. He made payment of the debt contingent upon a promise from Algeria to stop 
pirating, an order which so insulted the Algerian dey as to prompt him to make hasty and 
nasty declarations against Charles X. Charles X responded with a blockade of Algerian ports, 
and then on June 14, 1830 launched a full-scale invasion of Algeria. By July 5, 1830 the 
French claimed Algeria as a possession, beginning a period of colonialism lasting more than 
130 years (Brill 31 ). 
Soon after, Charles X was dethroned, and when Louis Phillipe stepped up he was actually 
a bit unsure as to what to do with this new possession. Finally, four years after the initial 
conquest, he declared Algeria a French territory and set up a colonial government to run the 
daily affairs of the country. The next step. the French thought, was to expand throughout 
Algeria to strengthen its hold on the country. The French were however, much to their 
surprise, met with extremely fierce resistance. In their zeal to convert the Algerians to 
Christianity, they gave the Muslims the catalyst to organize themselves to fight what became 
essentially a holy war. FinaUy, in 1847 the French were successful in breaking the last bit of 
Algerian resistance and began to finally make the transition to a French way of life (Brill 
30-34). 
After realizing a full conquest of Algeria, the French began in earnest attempts to settle 
Algeria and make it French. First and foremost. France began enticing her own citizens to 
relocate and settle in Algeria. As a matter of fact, by the 1880s there were over 150,000 
Frenchmen living in Algeria, compared to only aboul5,OOO at the time of the initial 
engagement with Algeria. In encouraging emigration of her own people, France was hoping 
that the Arabs would learn to be French by example. They would see the culture, language, 
habits, and mannerisms of true French people, and they would realize that they should adapt 
to this superior and civilized culture. This of course was not an accurate reading of local 
mentality; they never saw the utility in becoming French (Brill 34). 
Secondly, the French tried to make the Arabs more European by attempting to convert 
them to Christianity. Algerians in fact were only eligible to be French citizens if they 
renounced their Muslim faith in favor of Christianity. As one French missionary, Father 
Charles Foucaul<L explains, "If we cannot succeed in making Frenchmen of these people, they 
wlll drive us out The only way to make them into Frenchmen is to make them Christians" 
(Brill 34). However, most Arabs stoutly refused anything to do with the new European 
religion, preferring to fight valiantly to preserve their fonner way oftife ( Brill 34.5). 
Essentially, the French were active in every aspect of Algerian life. They began to take 
control of the culture, the land, the business, and the culture ofthis African country. As Brill 
states, "Algerians became despised second-class citizens in their own country" (Brill 35) 
Moreover, the French began to sell the land of Algeria, land that had belonged to the natives 
and was seized and consequently sold almost exclusively to Europeans without any sort of 
just compensation ror the original Algerian owners. As their land was seized, the Algerians 
began 
to have to look elsewhere for a way to earn a living, with most rmding nothing better than 
toiling on land owned by Europeans for a wage not much above a low level of subsistence. 
Thus, as Brill explains, "Deprived of work, language, and cultural heritage, many Algerians 
retreated to the protection oflslam and a dream of independent Algeria" (Brill 35). This 
translated into another mass movement for independence, which resulted much the same way 
as the preceding one. The native Algerians were "politically, socially, and economically 
silenced" (Brill 36). 
After varied attempts at gaining freedom during and in-between the two world wars, the 
Arabs were at last able to gain their long sought-after independence. For almost a decade, 
fierce fighting ensued in Algeri~ as the African guerrillas fought violently and ruthlessly with 
the French colons. Soon., word of the French's ferocious tactics for eliminating members of 
the Algerians freedom fighters reached the international community, with disapproval 
radiating from observers such as the United atioos and the Kennedy administration in the 
United States. Complicated by the fact that France fiercely wished to retain oil and natural 
gas resenres in the Sahara, negotiations proceeded to the point where De Gualle finaUy 
decreed that Algeria should be a free nation. The new leaders of Algeria set their official 
independence day for July 5, 1962, exactly 132 after France captured Algiers. 
However, for Algerians, gaining independence was actually the beginning of a long and 
difficult process. Now that the Algerians had their own country free from outside 
intervention, they had to figure out how to pick up the pieces left behind by the French and 
begin to build a new COWltry from them. Essentially, the revolutionary government was 
facing a country with no economy, since the existing one collapsed basicaUy when the colons 
left. and one with no political system to speak of. with the only facsimile of a government 
being the exiled National Liberation Front (FLN). Moreover, soon into Algeria' s first period 
of self-rule in over a century, different FLN factions began developing and executing rivalries 
for power, which combined with worsening conditions for the people made civil war a 
possibility (Brill 44-45). 
In September of 1962, elections were held, ones which were to facilitate the cession of 
power from the FLN to the new Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. Ahmed Ben 
Bella, backed militarily by Colonel Houari Boumediene, managed to gain enough of an edge 
to be elected premier. Bownediene was then rewarded with a prominent position as defense 
minister. Together, the two began the difficult task of piecing their broken country together 
once more (Brill 44-46). 
First and foremost, the new leaders began to set up parameters for the new government, 
boundaries which are directly reflective of the colonial period from which Algeria had just 
emerged_ Ben BeUa essentially began setting up an authoritative regime, with no notion that 
governments could be run any other way. He became the supreme commander of the army, 
head of the Supreme Court, and head of the FLN, the country ' s lone political party Brill 
45-46). 
Next, Ben Bella found that over 70% of his people were unemployed. Basically, the only 
educated members of society had been the colons, and with their ab ence the Algerians were 
left with only uneducated laborers. However, without the colons to run the farms and other 
industries, there was nowhere for the unskilled laborers to labor. A year after winning 
independence, in 1963, Ben Bella passed a set of laws referred to as the March Decrees. The 
main thrust of this legislation was that property abandoned by colons could be occupied by 
Algerians now. In this manner, the state actually took for itself some of the best farmland in 
the country. Moreover, as it took over this property, it began to institute socialist policies 
through which to administer it. The tate in fact came to own "the richest farmland, factories, 
mines, banks, transportation systems, and retail stores" (Brill 46). 
The Algerian nationals however, were not content with either the pace nor the content of 
Ben Bella's reforms. To begin, they were suffering immensely and felt that relief was needed 
imminently. SecondJy, they believed that Ben BelJa had become more concerned with 
advancing his international image than with the plight of his people at home. Thus, in June of 
1965, a mere two years into his rule, the army staged a ruthless coup, overthrowing Ben BeUa 
and putting in his place his comrade Boumediene. The instability which precipitates violent 
overthrows such as this one is directly related to the very nature of the societal boundaries 
installed by colonialism. Because the people have not been socialized to know what 
effective, democratic stable government is, they have no expectations to meet, no way of 
knowing how to establish an effective government (Brill 46). 
Under Boumediene, the authoritarian nature of Algeria was relaxed somewhat, with 
several changes being instituted which made the government more representative and less 
centered on one individual. Boumediene was concerned with giving the people more power 
on a local level and with allowing the citizens to be more involved in general . He even began 
holding elections, and was himsel f chosen as President through a true election. 
On the other hand, Boumediene had a much more difficult time in reorganizing the 
people economically. In the late sixties and early seventies he decided that Algeria's oil and 
gas resources should be rapidly developed, with the profits then being used to develop other 
industries and to generate some form of infrastructure. Indeed, he used a fulJ 70% of the 
profits from these two enterprises to reinvest in other industries. Moreover, Boumediene felt 
a great need for nationalization, particularly of French-owned oil refineries. In contrast to his 
predecessor, he also felt it wise to engage economically with France, regardless of the bad 
feelings which may still have existed. France was looking to buy oil, a commodity for which 
Algeria was seeking markets. Finally, in an attempt to at the very least feed his people, 
Boumedienne gave land that formally had belonged to the state to peasants, a departure from 
Ben Bella's strict socialism. However, none of these changes was able to help Algeria 
overcome ber colonial legacy. Although they all appeared on the surface to be useful, it is 
more difficult than most can imagine to accomplish a complete restructuring of an entire 
society. which is the only true way the colonial yoke can be shed, allowing the country to 
move on and become prosperous (Brill 47-48). 
In 1978, Bownediene died and new elections were held., elections which heralded the rise 
to power of a progressive reformer. Colonel Chadli Benjedid. The two main differences 
between Benjedid and his predecessor were their approaches to the economy and to 
agriculture. In an attempt to eliminate, or at least reduce, corruption and mismanagement, 
Benjedid separated the large state--<>perated businesses and fanns into smaller and more 
manageable sizes. Moreover and most importantly, he finally made the Algerian economy 
accessible to foreign investment. Finally, although setbacks and obstacles have occurred 
since Benjedid assumed control and wilt most likely persist in being a problem, the 
government of Algeria is at least actively attempting to resociauze its people into a cohesive 
and relatively successful country. As Brill aptly states, 
AJgeria has come a long way since independence. But the maturing country 
continues to grapple with its identity in the modem industrialized world. Algeria's 
leaders accept the chaUenge of reform. Only time will tell whether they can quiet 
the unrest and lead Algeria into full adulthood (BriU 53). 
Case Study #2: Ivory Coast 
The French influence in the Ivory Coast goes back as far the 16005, when 5 French 
missionaries established a mission in Assini The missionaries were, however, unprepared for 
the severe heat and the unrelenting tropical diseases, with 3 of the 5 dying in the first year. 
The remaining two returned to their native France. Half a century later, a French navy ship 
docked in rusini, taking two Assini youths with them for the return voyage to France. One of 
the young men, a prince, was given a French education and was converted to Christianity. He 
feJt it his cailing to return to Assini with missionaries and soldiers to establish a military 
OlltpoSt. However, once again unprepared for the climate and the tropical affiictions, the 
attempt at settlement failed (Kummer 31). 
It was not until the 1800s that France decided once more to try her lot with what became 
the Ivory Coast. From the 18405 to the 1860s, France sailed around the Gulf of Guinea, 
interested in opening relations with the ]vory Coast. Finally. French navy men were 
successful in convincing chiefs from both Assini and Sassandra to enter into agreements with 
France. These treaties provided that the Ivory Coast was to trade with France and France 
alone. Moreover, the French were to have the right to build outposts and military forts, 
compensating the chiefs fairly for use of their land (Kummer 32). By the I 860s, a Frenchman 
called Arthur Verdier was running several successful French trading posts. Essentially, the 
French government had given Verdier full reign with the 
posts, so to speak., because of their relatively weak position in the world at that time, having 
just suffered defeat at the hands of Prussia. Verdier was active in exporting palm oil, and he 
was instrumental in precipitating the production of cocoa and coffee plantations (Kummer 
32). 
In Europe during this era however, the atmosphere became ripe for colonization. The 
race for power between European powers became contingent on who had the most colonies. 
A manifestation of this mentality is seen at the Berlin Conference, where the issue was 
addressed and it was ultimately decided that any European country could claim sovereignty 
over any African one, so long as government representatives from the colonizing nation are 
present in the country being colonized (Kummer 33). 
Thus, swept up in the tide equating colonies with national grandeur, France decides that 
she wil1 retake ber trading posts in the Ivory Coast. Thus, two representatives were sent, 
Louis-Gustave Binger and Marcel Tbeich-Laplene. who worked their way through the Ivory 
Coast, making agreements and treaties with the local chiefs. The chiefs signed the treaties 
under the illusion that the French would help settle internal splits and fragmentation . 
However, what the chiefs really did was sign away most of their country, as the treaties 
became the basis for most of France's later claim to the land comprising the Ivory Coast 
(Kummer 33). 
In 1893. France declared the Ivory Coast a true colony, installed Louis-Gustave Binger as 
governor, and established a capital at Grand-Bassam. Only a few, short years later however, 
disease once again afflicted the French, killing nearly 2/3 of the Europeans who had located 
within the lvory Coast, prompting the relocation of the capital to the healthier Bingerville. 
At this point, essentially the French had control of only narrow pieces of the Ivory Coast 
which ran along the coast, in addition to a bit of land near the two main rivers. Regrettably in 
their opinion, they had failed to negotiate treaties with the people of the interior. Thus, 
because France bad not peaceable made agreements with all Ivorians, some resistance was 
met by the French troops attempting takeover. A particularly notable leader of resistance to 
French rule was Samory Toure, who was committed to the Islamic state. By 1898 however, 
the resistors' main voice was silenced, with the French exiling Samory to Gabon. After his 
death in 1900, the other rain forest people began to organize revolts against the French 
administration of the Ivory Coast. The French however held on amazingly unflinchingly and 
steadfastly. By 1916 the French had effectively secured control of the Ivory Coast (Kummer 
37-38). 
After solidifying its control, the French began in earnest to set up a colonial government 
for the Ivory Coast. Before its era of French domination, the Ivory Coast had never known 
any form of centralized government. Instead, the country was split up, with a different faction 
having local power in small areas. The French however undertook an endeavor to break the 
country up into districts, with each controlled by French commanders. It should be n ted that 
the lvorians did in fact become subjects of the French government; they were denied 
citizenship however. This meant that without any rights, the Ivorians had to pay taxes, were 
forced to do public labor, were drafted into the French military, and were given prison 
sentences without the benefi t of a trial (Kummer 38). 
The French colonizers also changed the economy of the ]vory Coast. Before the French 
took power, the Ivorian economy was one based on subsistence. Each village grew enough to 
sustain itself However, with the addition of the French tn:fluence, the Ivorians began to grow 
huge cash crops, including cocoa, pineapples, bananas, and coffee. Most of the plantations 
on which these crops were produced were owned by the French. A few Ivorians could also 
own plantations, but they were not allowed to use the free labor to which the French were 
privy (Kummer 38-42). 
Finally, one should examine the cultural transformation the African nation underwent at 
the hands of the French. France declared French the official language, decreed that aU 
business should use the refmed language of French and should be conducted according to its 
superior customs. Moreover, the French set about reforming the pagan lvorians to 
Christianity. setting up both Protestant and Catholic missionaries. The missionaries then 
established schools, where the Ivorians could Jearn the French language and customs, and 
then find a pLace in the colonial government. Eventually, two new classes ofIvorians 
emerged, Ivorian planters and Ivorian civil servants. Both of these classes had enough money 
to afford education's for their children, who were thus able themselves to advance to decent 
positions in the new economy. As this happened on a larger and larger basis, the gap between 
these two, new classes ofIvorians and between the rural, poor citizens widened, with 
colonjalism being a direct cause of this widening social gap (Kummer 39-41 ). 
There is obviously no way to be sure how long this path would have been left unruffled 
were it not for the two world wars, which stirred emotions and 10yaJties in the Ivory Coast. 
During World War II, at first, the colonial government joined forces with the Vichy 
government which had taken over France. When Charles de Gaulle came to prominence 
however, he was backed vehemently by the Ivorians. As a reward of sorts for their support,. 
de Gaulle approved the commencement of the SyndicaJ Agrico/e Africain. The leader of the 
SAA was the popular and powerful Felix Houphouet-Boigny. He wished to end the free labor 
source used by the French planters, in addition demanding that Ivorian farmers receive the 
same prices for goods and the French (Kummer 41-43). 
In addition to al lowing the union, the French government found itself making all manner 
of concessions to this new Jvorian Coast group. Because it was beaten down from a costly 
war, both morally and economically, France began to consider different methods for 
administering ber colonies. In 1945, she even agreed to aJlow the Ivory Coast the right to 
hold elections. The elections were for delegates to the Constituent Assembly in Paris; one 
was chosen by the settlers, and the other was Houphouet-Boigny. Houphouet-Boigny was 
able to achieve sweeping reforms, making him a hero to the Ivorians. He aboHshed the 
system which compeJled Ivorians to work for free and saw that all Iv orians were granted 
French citizenship. With their newfound citizenship, Ivorians enjoyed a freedom of speech 
and assembly, the right to a trial , and even a limited light to vote. However, the Ivorians 
would 
not be truly content until they were in complete charge of their own nation (Kummer 44). 
Interestingly enough and on a much different tone from that seen in Algeria, France 
continued in giving the Ivory Coast more and more opportunity for self-government. Due to 
the new rules, all Ivorians were permitting to vote, they were able to choose representatives 
for local and district positions, and the Territorial Assembly could actually pass binding laws 
for Ivory Coast. Moreover, after Charles de Gaulle assumed the presidency, the French 
Community was developed. Under this plan, each French territory was allowed to choose 
whether to become a member. lfthey chose to join, they were then permitted to decide upon 
their own government and to develop their own constitution. In 1958, Ivory Coast chose to 
rule herself, within the confines of the Community. In their first elections, the lvorians 
elected Houphouet-Boigny to the position of prime minister. Under his leadership, the ivory 
Coast continued their quest for independence. Finally. in 1960 France developed a policy 
which allowed all members of the French Community to become independent if they wished, 
an opportunity of which the Ivory Coast took advantage (Kummer 48-49). Ivory Coast had 
become the most prosperous territory in French Africa, and for that she was rewarded with 
some decent attempts by France at building an infrastructure to facilitate the ongoing project 
of developing Ivory Coast's economy. Moreover, after declaring her independence, the Ivory 
Coast decided to keep her ties to the French, giving them a decent base for foreign trade 
(Kummer 48-50). 
BasicalJy, the Ivory Coast became an example of what can be accomplished with one 
charismatic leader, in this case Houphouet-Boigny. Single-handedly, Houphouet Boigny 
managed to keep his regime in power and more than a mere facade of order. He was firm in 
deaUng with any dissenters, but "justified his actions on the grounds that political stability 
was required to achieve economic prosperity" (Kummer 49). During his many terms as 
president, Houphouet authorized numerous opposition parties, appointed A1assane Ouattara, a 
man who had worked previously with the International Monetary Fund, to work for real 
economic reform, and allowed true multiparty elections to be held. Thus, it is clear that 
through leadership, Ivory Coast had a much different colonial experience than the 
before-discussed Algeria. Although being colonized has of course erected barriers for her, it 
seems as though she is proof that the colonial legacy can be effectively overcome (Kummer 
SO). 
Conclusion: 
Thus, after examining the two case studies presented above, it seems without question 
that the period of colonization by France had a significant impact upon present-day events. 
Their colonial legacies make it difficult for these countries to estabJish stable politicaJ 
regimes, stable economies, sturdy infrastructures, and peaceful power transfers. However, as 
has also been seen, colonized countries are not necessarily doomed to always be part of the 
third world. By addressing the basic structures instituted by colonjalism countries can begin 
to truly overcome their imperialist legacies. The first case study, Algeria, presents a situation 
in which the essential problems were not addressed, and the country still struggles today to 
establish a normal regime for itself. In the second country examined however, Ivory Coast,. 
the leaders were able to hit right at the heart of her problems due to colonialism, thus making 
it possible for her to rise above the lot left to her by France. Therefore, the premise under 
whjch this paper was written, that the essential problems caused by colonialism must be 
addressed before the country can move forward, are substantiated by the case studies 
presented. 
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